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WHO WILL WATCH THE WATCHERS?:
ENACTING A CORPORATE OBSERVING BOARD
TO INCREASE CONSIDERATION OF
STAKEHOLDER INTERESTS
Zachary Needle*
Modern U.S. corporate law has compelled corporate directors to make
decisions that maximize share value regardless of the effect they have on the
firm’s other stakeholders, like employees, creditors, and suppliers. While
shareholder primacy is the norm in the United States, there are competing
theories, mainly the stakeholder model, that have cognizable influence not
only in the United States but also in foreign states.
Both theories have their drawbacks, but the “short-termism” associated
with shareholder primacy can damage a firm’s health. Directors make
decisions that benefit the firm in the short term but often wipe out long-term
value.
This Note proposes a novel solution to this problem that looks to minimally
disrupt current practices while also exacting considerable changes to the
decision-making process for directors: promulgating a federal rule through
the Securities and Exchange Commission to create an “observing board,”
which will represent specific stakeholder groups.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2018, Verizon was rallying on the back of a healthy economy. Its stock
price had risen from $46.29 in March,1 to $54.94 by October 1,2 amounting
to an 18.7 percent increase in a little over six months. Verizon’s directors
also announced that they would be increasing the quarterly dividend by 2.1
percent, to 60.25 cents per share.3 In light of this financial success, it must
have been surprising for 44,000 Verizon employees when they heard they
had been laid off.4 After the layoffs, while many workers scrambled to find
employment before the holiday season, shareholders of Verizon saw the
company’s stock price rise to $60.30.5

1. See Verizon Communications Inc. (VZ): NYSE–Nasdaq Real Time Price, YAHOO!
FIN., https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/VZ [https://perma.cc/2GEP-YMGC] (last visited Oct. 3
2, 2020) (click the chart tab, then look at a five-year chart)
2. See id.
3. See Lawrence C. Strauss, Verizon Announces Another Dividend Hike, BARRON’S
(Sept. 6, 2018, 4:52 PM), https://www.barrons.com/articles/verizon-announces-anotherdividend-hike-1536267141?mod=article_inline [https://perma.cc/DB58-D8U3].
4. See Jeb Su, Verizon Lays Off 44,000, Transfers 2,500 More IT Jobs to Indian
Outsourcer Infosys, FORBES (Oct. 5, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jeanbaptiste/2018/
10/05/verizon-lays-off-44000-transfers-2500-more-it-jobs-to-indian-outsourcerinfosys/#cb1da5e46f59 [https://perma.cc/U4YE-K5U4]. While Verizon is a big corporation,
the combined layoffs and transfers still affected over 30 percent of its workforce. Id.
5. See Verizon Communications Inc. (VZ): NYSE–Nasdaq Real Time Price, supra note
1.
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Sequences such as the above are not unique in the current U.S. corporate
climate.6 As a result, the support for corporate governance reform has grown
in recent years. Politicians like Elizabeth Warren7 and Bernie Sanders,8 chief
executives like Jeff Bezos and Jamie Dimon,9 and prominent investment
corporations like BlackRock10 and Vanguard11 have reignited debate
regarding whether a corporation should address its nonshareholder
constituencies. The traditional norm in U.S. corporate law has been that the
board of directors owes a duty of loyalty to the shareholders.12 This duty is
often framed as maximizing shareholder wealth.13
Critics of “shareholder primacy,” however, have posited a different
argument that insists the board of directors should consider the interests of
all stakeholders of the firm: employees, creditors, suppliers, and the nearby
community, among others.14
These advocates contend that many
fundamental assumptions of shareholder primacy are rooted in tenuous

6. See generally Jill Cornfile & Annie Nova, Unemployment Just Hit 14.7% yet the
Market Is Way up. Please Explain!, CNBC (May 8, 2020), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/05/
08/unemployment-is-higher-than-ever-so-why-is-the-market-rallying.html [https://perma.cc/
64SF-THKV].
7. Accountable Capitalism Act, S. 3348, 115th Cong. (2018) (sponsored by Senator
Elizabeth Warren).
8. See generally Corporate Accountability and Democracy Plan, BERNIE,
https://berniesanders.com/issues/corporate-accountability-and-democracy [https://perma.cc/
9NCG-6NWK] (last visited Oct. 3, 2020).
9. Business Roundtable Redefines the Purpose of a Corporation to Promote ‘An
Economy That Serves All Americans,’ BUS. ROUNDTABLE (Aug. 19, 2019),
https://www.businessroundtable.org/business-roundtable-redefines-the-purpose-of-acorporation-to-promote-an-economy-that-serves-all-americans
[https://perma.cc/UMS8BSZK] (committing to investing in employees, dealing fairly and ethically with suppliers, and
supporting the surrounding communities as means of emphasizing all stakeholders). Jeff
Bezos and Jamie Dimon, along with 179 other CEOs, are signatories. See Statement on the
Purpose of a Corporation, BUS. ROUNDTABLE (Aug. 2019), https://opportunity.
businessroundtable.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/BRT-Statement-on-the-Purpose-of-aCorporation-with-Signatures.pdf [https://perma.cc/35TB-X45G].
10. Larry Fink, Larry Fink’s 2018 Letter to CEOS: A Sense of Purpose, BLACKROCK,
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/2018-larry-fink-ceo-letter
[https://perma.cc/DH2B-PX3N] (last visited Oct. 3, 2020) (declaring the importance of
investing in corporations that benefit all their stakeholders and encouraging companies to put
more of an emphasis on their “critical stakeholders”).
11. VANGUARD, INVESTMENT STEWARDSHIP:
2018 ANNUAL REPORT 2 (2018),
https://about.vanguard.com/investment-stewardship/perspectives-and-commentary/2018_
investment_stewardship_annual_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/2LDX-4TUG].
12. See generally Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase
Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Sept. 13, 1970), http://umich.edu/~thecore/doc/Friedman.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6N2T-ZMUX].
13. See Henry Hansmaan & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law,
89 GEO. L.J. 439, 450, 468 (2001).
14. See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of
Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247 (1999); see also ROBERT PHILLIPS, STAKEHOLDER THEORY
AND ORGANIZATIONAL ETHICS 135–52 (2003); Virginia Harper Ho, “Enlightened Shareholder
Value”: Corporate Governance Beyond the Shareholder-Stakeholder Divide, 36 J. CORP. L.
59, 61 (2010).
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premises15 and that corporate models involving all stakeholders offer
additional benefits to firms.16
In theory, the recent proclamations of distinguished executives and
institutional investors are a welcome sign for the adoption of a more
stakeholder-centric governance model.17 However, these statements are
likely just lip service to placate the general public.18 Ultimately, it is the
firm’s shareholders who to vote to appoint directors.19 Likewise, only
shareholders have a direct right to sue directors.20 That being the case, there
is no real incentive for directors to act at the behest of other stakeholders.21
This is particularly concerning since this lack of incentive can lead to myopic
decisions that harm the firm in the long run. This is known as “shorttermism.”
Part I of this Note will explore the shareholder primacy and stakeholder
models. It will first look at how shareholder primacy became entrenched as
the norm in U.S. corporate law. The Note will initially discuss some of the
benefits and drawbacks of this model. Then, it will conduct a similar
discussion for the stakeholder model by analyzing some circumstances where
a firm takes all stakeholders into account and addresses the benefits and
disadvantages of this approach.
Part II will observe the issues that arise when firms follow the shareholder
primacy model. Here, the Note will focus on short-termism and its adverse
effects on corporate health. This part will also examine the link between a
stakeholder approach and “long-termism.”
Finally, Part III will propose promulgating a new Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) rule that requires companies of a certain size to create a
three-person “observing board,” consisting of employee, creditor, and
minority shareholder representatives. This solution allows for the board of
directors to focus its business strategies on benefitting all stakeholders, not
just shareholders.

15. See Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1189, 1192–94 (2002).
16. See, e.g., Caroline Flammer & Aleksandra Kacperczyk, The Impact of Stakeholder
Orientation on Innovation: Evidence from a Natural Experiment, 62 MGMT. SCI. 1982, 1984–
86 (2016); Jordi Surroca, Josep A. Tribó & Sandra Waddock, Corporate Responsibility and
Financial Performance: The Role of Intangible Resources, 31 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 463, 466–
72 (2010).
17. See, e.g., Fink, supra note 10; Business Roundtable Redefines the Purpose of a
Corporation to Promote ‘An Economy That Serves All Americans,’ supra note 9.
18. See, e.g., Jordan Weissmann, America’s Most Powerful CEOs Say They No Longer
Only Care About Shareholder Value. Here’s How They Can Prove It., SLATE (Aug. 21, 2019),
https://slate.com/business/2019/08/ceos-shareholder-value-investors-businessroundtable.html [https://perma.cc/CFR9-Z8FY].
19. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(b) (2020); see also Seidman & Assocs. v. G.A. Fin.,
Inc., 837 A.2d 21, 26 (Del. Ch. 2003). See generally Leo E. Strine Jr., Making It Easier for
Directors to “Do the Right Thing”?, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 235 (2014).
20. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 327; Strine Jr., supra note 19, at 238.
21. See generally Strine Jr., supra note 19.
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I. COMPETING MODELS: WHO DOES THE CORPORATION CARE ABOUT?
Debate has raged for almost a century over the purpose of a corporation.22
One’s stance in this debate, as well as one’s notion as to which interested
parties a corporation should prioritize, inevitably depends on which of the
two primary schools of thought one adopts. Those who side with Professor
Adolf Berle, an early advocate of shareholder primacy, insist that the
corporation should only work to maximize the wealth of its shareholders.23
Alternatively, those who side with Professor E. Merrick Dodd maintain that
the corporation should concern itself with all the firm’s major stakeholder
groups.24
Part I.A provides a brief overview of the function of a corporation’s board
of directors, the board that makes and approves major decisions affecting
stakeholders. Part I.B then details the shareholder primacy model. Part I.C
details the stakeholder theory.
A. The Board of Directors
Generally, corporations elect a board of directors to manage their business
and affairs.25 The rules guiding board composition, powers, and duties are
governed by state law, which means there can be variations depending on the
firm’s place of incorporation.26 Due to its corporation-friendly laws, most
companies incorporate in Delaware, making its corporate law highly
significant in any business-related matter.27 Thus, this Note will frequently
refer to Delaware law for examples and analyses.

22. Compare Adolf A. Berle Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV.
1049 (1931), with E. Merrick Dodd Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45
HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1932).
23. See, e.g., William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Shareholder Primacy’s
Corporatist Origins: Adolf Berle and the Modern Corporation, 34 J. CORP. L. 99, 147–49
(2008).
24. See A. A. Sommer Jr., Whom Should the Corporation Serve?: The Berle-Dodd
Debate Revisited Sixty Years Later, 16 DEL. J. CORP. L. 33, 54 (1991).
25. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a).
26. See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975).
27. This Note will primarily focus on Delaware law as it is the most significant and
impactful state in terms of corporate law. See Annual Report Statistics, DEL. DIV. OF CORPS.,
https://corpfiles.delaware.gov/Annual-Reports/Division-of-Corporations-2018-AnnualReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/UZ6T-WUUS] (last visited Oct. 3, 2020) (noting that 67.2
percent of all Fortune 500 companies are incorporated in Delaware and, as of 2018, 1.4 million
legal entities are incorporated in the state). Its judges are considered top-notch and many other
states adopt similar approaches to Delaware’s corporate law. See Alana Semuels, The Tiny
State Whose Laws Affect Workers Everywhere, ATLANTIC (Oct. 3, 2016), https://www.
theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/10/corporate-governance/502487 [https://perma.cc/
5UNU-JXEB] (quoting Vice Chancellor Sam Glasscock III as saying that “Delaware common
law is really the national law of corporations for the most part”). Delaware has probably won
the race to the top (or the race to the bottom, depending on what aspect of corporate law one
discusses) when it comes to corporate law and incorporations. A discussion as to to the
reasons why is outside the scope of this Note, but a considerable amount of literature has been
published on the subject. See, e.g., Daniel J. H. Greenwood, Democracy and Delaware: The
Mysterious Race to the Bottom/Top, 23 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 381, 382–84 (2005); Marcel
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A board’s composition and election process are salient drivers of corporate
governance and must be addressed in turn. The number of directors on a
company’s board will vary depending on the corporation’s certificate of
incorporation and bylaws.28 These directors are elected by the shareholders
as provided in the company’s certificate of incorporation.29 While
arrangements may differ, each shareholder is typically entitled to one vote
for every share owned.30 Term lengths of directors also vary depending on
the certificate of incorporation and bylaws. A nonstaggered board of
directors will sit for election annually.31 However, if the board is staggered,
directors often sit for three-year terms.32 Staggered boards have begun to fall
out of favor, however.33
The board of directors owes many duties to the shareholders of the
corporation it represents.34 Primarily, this stems from the reality that the
property it manages is not its own but that of the shareholders. The board
thus owes a fiduciary duty to the shareholders.35 However, directors’ duties
depend on the current financial state of the company.36 Generally, the duties
include a duty to govern the business and affairs of the corporation,37 “an
unyielding fiduciary duty to protect the interests of the corporation and to act
in the best interests of its shareholders,”38 and a duty to fully disclose all
material information.39 It is important to note that no state, including
Delaware, imposes a rigid duty to maximize shareholder value.40 Even so,

Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in Corporate Law, 55 STAN. L. REV.
679, 684 (2002) (arguing that states no longer compete and that Delaware has a monopoly).
28. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(b).
29. See id. § 212(a).
30. See id. Often, however, a corporation will have different classes of stock that allow
for more than a single vote per share. See Class of Shares, INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/class.asp [https://perma.cc/9FY7-LWEA] (last visited
Oct. 3, 2020).
31. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211.
32. See id. § 141(d).
33. See generally Lucian Bebchuk et al., Towards the Declassification of S&P 500
Boards, 3 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 157 (2013).
34. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985); Graham v. Allis-Chalmers
Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963); In re Caremark Int’l, Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d
959 (Del. Ch. 1996); Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int’l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049 (Del. Ch. 1996).
35. See In re USACafes, L.P. Litig., 600 A.2d 43, 48 (Del. Ch. 1991).
36. More specifically, the duties of directors can differ when the company is solvent
versus insolvent, as well as during takeover attempts. Compare Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews
& Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986), with Kidde Indus., Inc. v. Weaver Corp., 593
A.2d 563 (Del. Ch. 1991).
37. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a); see also Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc.,
571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 1989). This is one of the most fundamental duties a director has.
See generally Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 360 (Del. 1993).
38. Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 360. This includes all shareholders, not just those who
specifically elected the director if the corporate bylaws call for a split voting structure. See
generally Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
39. See TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976); Stroud v. Grace, 606
A.2d 75, 84–85 (Del. 1992).
40. See, e.g., Paramount Commc’ns, Inc., 571 A.2d at 1150; Revlon, Inc., 506 A.2d at
179–81.
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most corporations pursue shareholder wealth maximization in harmony with
the shareholder primacy model.
B. The Shareholder Primacy Model
The shareholder primacy model is the dominant theory of corporate
governance in the United States.41 Although not recognized as law, it is a
clearly established norm that the board of directors must maximize the wealth
of the firm’s shareholders.42
Part I.B.1 discusses the history and current state of the model. Part I.B.2
then analyzes the benefits to an approach that utilizes shareholder primacy.
This part will also introduce the drawbacks of this model, although a more
comprehensive discussion will be saved for Part II of this Note.
1. The History and Case Law of Shareholder Primacy
The debate surrounding corporate purpose has its origins in a series of
articles written by Professors Berle and Dodd in the 1930s.43 Berle, in his
article Corporate Powers as Powers of Trust, expounded his trust theory of
corporations.44 He posited that managers were trustees of the shareholders
and, therefore, should only use their corporate powers for the benefit of the
shareholder.45 He further stated that there was a limitation to this corporate
power, and when managers used their power to the “detriment” of the
shareholder, the judiciary should step in.46 In his 1970 essay for the New
York Times, Milton Friedman introduced shareholder primacy to the wider
public.47 In the essay, he argued that “there is one and only one social
responsibility of business—to use its resources and engage in activities
designed to increase its profits.”48 Since that essay, shareholder primacy has
become more entrenched in U.S. corporate law.49
Social and political changes in the 1980s further popularized the
shareholder primacy model. The deregulatory environment that President
Ronald Reagan fashioned helped catalyze shareholder wealth
maximization.50 Likewise, the corporate takeover atmosphere of the 1980s
41. See Robert J. Rhee, A Legal Theory of Shareholder Primacy, 102 MINN. L. REV. 1951,
1953–54 (2018).
42. See id. at 1956–60.
43. Compare Berle Jr., supra note 22, with Dodd Jr., supra note 22.
44. See Berle Jr., supra note 22, at 1074.
45. See id. at 1049.
46. See id. For an in-depth look at the origins of Berle’s positions, see, for example,
Bratton & Wachter, supra note 23.
47. See Friedman, supra note 12, at 1.
48. See id. at 6.
49. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 13, at 440–41; Amir N. Licht, The
Maximands of Corporate Governance: A Theory of Values and Cognitive Style, 29 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 649, 650–52 (2004); D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP.
L. 277, 277–79 (1998).
50. David J. Berger, In Search of Lost Time: What If Delaware Had Not Adopted
Shareholder Primacy?, in THE CORPORATE CONTRACT IN CHANGING TIMES: IS THE LAW
KEEPING UP? 48, 49–50 (2019).
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cultivated a corporate environment ripe for the implementation of the
shareholder primacy norm.51 It became so prevalent in corporate law that in
the early twenty-first century, Professors Henry Hansmann and Reinier
Kraakman declared there was no serious competitor to the shareholder model
and that its “triumph . . . over its principal competitors is now assured.”52
However, the 2007–2008 financial crisis reinvigorated attacks on the
shareholder primacy model from scholars and economists.53 Even so, the
model is still the established norm in corporate law.54
The case law that established shareholder primacy as the norm in Delaware
law sprouted in the early twentieth-century, then took root in two seminal
cases in the 1980s.55 Yet, shareholder primacy’s rise began not in Delaware
but rather in Michigan, with Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.56 There, the Michigan
Supreme Court stated, “[a] business corporation is organized and carried on
primarily for the profit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are
to be employed for that end.”57 It was not until over sixty years later that
Delaware, through a series of decisions, adopted a similar view.58 First in
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,59 the Delaware Supreme Court
considered whether a board of directors facing a takeover bid could consider
the interests of groups other than the shareholders.60 The court reiterated the
“basic principle that corporate directors have a fiduciary duty to act in the
best interests of the corporation’s stockholders.”61 One year later, in the
formative Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings,62 the same court
addressed whether the board of directors could consider constituencies other
than shareholders.63 The court concluded that a board can consider various
constituencies so long as there are “rationally related benefits” for the
shareholders.64 The court made it clear that directors of a corporation need
to strive to maximize the wealth of shareholders.65 The board can consider
51. See id. at 50.
52. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 13, at 468.
53. See, e.g., William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder
Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 653 (2010).
54. See Rhee, supra note 41, at 1956–60.
55. See infra note 58.
56. 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
57. See id. at 684. The court uses the term “stockholder,” which is interchangeable with
“shareholder,” the term that this Note prefers.
58. See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173, 179 (Del.
1986); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985); eBay Domestic
Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 26 (Del. Ch. 2010). See generally Leo E. Strine Jr.,
The Dangers of Denial: The Need for a Clear-Eyed Understanding of the Power and
Accountability Structure Established by the Delaware General Corporation Law, 50 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 761, 768–81 (2015).
59. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
60. See id. at 949.
61. Id. at 955; see also Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939). Note that
“stockholder” is synonymous with “shareholder.”
62. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
63. Id. at 176.
64. Id.
65. See id.; see also Strine Jr., supra note 58, at 769–73.
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nonshareholder interests only if they can be justified as benefiting the
shareholders as well.66
This general proposition was recently validated in eBay Domestic
Holdings v. Newmark,67 where the Delaware Court of Chancery started by
restating the general principle that directors are fiduciaries of the
corporation’s shareholders.68 It went on to state that, since the corporation
was for-profit, “directors are bound by the fiduciary duties and standards that
accompany that form. Those standards include acting to promote the value
of the corporation for the benefit of its stockholders.”69 Thus, the court
concluded by rejecting a corporate policy that openly admitted to not seeking
to maximize the economic value of the firm for its shareholders.70 These
cases demonstrate how embedded shareholder primacy has become in
Delaware corporate law, which in turn governs the structure of a large portion
of U.S. businesses.71 Again, it is important to note that there is no statutory
provision in Delaware mandating shareholder wealth maximization.72
2. Benefits of Utilizing a Shareholder Primacy Model
Several theoretical benefits derive from shareholder primacy, which
helped champion the model. The reduction of agency costs is one of the chief
advantages of the model.73 Many argue that directors are agents and act on
behalf of the principals, the shareholders.74 Directors are entrusted with
authority by the corporation and its shareholders, and they exercise this
authority for a fee.75 This typically indicates an agency relationship.76 When
the principal can better monitor the agent, there is a strong likelihood that
agency costs are diminished.77 It is straightforward to manage and monitor
the agent when the sole measurement is stock price.78 The agent cannot mask
self-motivated decisions.79 The duty to maximize shareholder wealth
compels the agent to act in the best interest of the principal, thereby reducing
agency and monitoring costs.
66. See id. at 771.
67. 16 A.3d 1 (Del. Ch. 2010).
68. See id. at 26.
69. See id. at 34.
70. See id. at 35.
71. See Annual Report Statistics, supra note 27.
72. See Rhee, supra note 41, at 1956–60.
73. See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of
Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547 (2003); William W. Bratton & Michael L.
Wachter, Shareholders and Social Welfare, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 489 (2013); Michael C.
Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and
Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
74. See Bainbridge, supra note 73, at 565. See generally Jensen & Meckling, supra note
73.
75. See Barry D. Baysinger & Henry N. Butler, Race for the Bottom v. Climb to the Top:
The ALI Project and Uniformity in Corporate Law, 10 J. CORP. L. 431, 436 (1985).
76. See id.
77. See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 73, at 503.
78. See Stout, supra note 15, at 1200.
79. See id.
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The incentive programs many corporations use reinforce the emphasis on
reducing agency costs.80 The salaries and bonuses paid out to managers are
often tied directly to share price.81 Aligning the interests of the shareholders
(principals) and the directors (agents) plays into the theme of reducing
agency costs.82
This potential reduction in costs can then lead to maximization of the
company’s overall value.83 Some argue that increases in value can, in turn,
lead to greater societal wealth.84 As the residual claimants to the
corporation’s assets and earnings,85 shareholders arguably have the strongest
incentive to maximize the corporation’s productivity and thus, overall
value.86
There are also potential drawbacks to shareholder primacy. The most
relevant for purposes of this Note is the pervasion of short-termism in
corporate decision-making. When the shareholders’ interests are paramount,
directors may be incentivized to make decisions that increase share value in
the short term while creating a long-term detriment to the company.87 This
Note will expand on this issue in Part II.88 A secondary, yet also significant
difficulty of the shareholder primacy model is that it threatens creditor
welfare.89 The worry stems from the fact that, since interests of shareholders
and creditors can conflict, decision makers are incentivized to externalize
risk onto the firm’s creditors when shareholders are prioritized.90 For
example, when a firm pays out dividends or borrows more, shareholders’
expected returns increase while the chances of repayment for creditors
decreases.91

80. See STEEN THOMSEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:
AND SYSTEMS 175 (2008).

MECHANISMS

81. See id.
82. See id. at 173–75.
83. See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 73, at 503.
84. See id.
85. A residual claimant is the person who has the remaining claim on a company’s net
cash flows. See Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control,
26 J.L. & ECON. 301, 302 (1983).
86. See Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and
Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 788 (1972); Mark E. Van Der Weide,
Against Fiduciary Duties to Corporate Stakeholders, 21 DEL. J. CORP. L. 27, 57 (1996).
87. See David J. Berger, Reconsidering Stockholder Primacy in an Era of Corporate
Purpose, 74 BUS. L.J. 659, 667 (2019).
88. See infra Part II.
89. See Lynn A. Stout, The Toxic Side Effects of Shareholder Primacy, 161 U. PA. L. REV.
2003, 2011 (2013).
90. See Edward B. Rock, Adapting to the New Shareholder-Centric Reality, 161 U. PA. L.
REV. 1907, 1928 (2013).
91. See Stout, supra note 89, at 2011.
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C. The Stakeholder Model
The primary competing view to shareholder primacy is one that
emphasizes all the stakeholders of a corporation, not just the shareholders.92
While rarely utilized by American corporations, the theory still has
significant support from scholars.93 Further, many foreign countries have
corporate governance laws that reflect these principles.94 Recent U.S.
corporate law innovations also demonstrate the theory’s constant, yet
shrouded, presence.95
Part I.C.1 will examine the history of this theory in the United States as
well as the sparse case law that veers away from strict shareholder primacy.
Part I.C.2 will discuss benefit corporations, a newer innovation from states
that allows a board of directors to consider actors beyond the shareholder.
Part I.C.3 will briefly explore pertinent foreign law that utilizes a stakeholder
approach. Finally, Part I.C.4 will consider some of the benefits and
drawbacks of the theory.
1. History and Case Law
In contrast to Professor Berle, Professor Dodd argued that corporations
should have “a social service as well as a profit-making function.”96 Dodd
believed that managers should act as the trustees for the general public and
should use their corporations to address social issues.97 Throughout the
twentieth century, however, this view took a back seat to shareholder
primacy.98 It eventually began to creep back into the public eye in the 1980s
with R. Edward Freeman’s Strategic Management: A Stakeholder
Approach.99 The adoption of constituency statutes, which allow directors to
consider other constituency groups, by some states in the late 1980s and early
1990s rekindled the debate between shareholder and stakeholder models of
corporate governance.100
There is some case law suggesting that directors must consider
nonshareholder over shareholder interests at times. Unocal, for example,
indicated that a board of directors could take into account factors unrelated
to maximizing shareholder wealth when making decisions in the hostile
takeover realm.101 This decision granted the board of directors great
92. See generally R. EDWARD FREEMAN, STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT: A STAKEHOLDER
APPROACH (2010).
93. See, e.g., LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING
SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC (2012).
94. See infra notes 122–37
95. See infra notes 109–20.
96. Dodd Jr., supra note 22, at 1148.
97. See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 23, at 125.
98. See supra Part I.B.1.
99. See generally Licht, supra note 49, at 721–22 (discussing Freeman’s “landmark”
book).
100. See id. at 705.
101. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985) (stating that
one factor a board can consider is “the impact on ‘constituencies’ other than shareholders (i.e.,
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flexibility in defending against takeover attempts.
Paramount
Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc.102 is another Delaware Supreme Court
decision where the court noted that a board of directors “is not under any per
se duty to maximize shareholder value.”103 Although later decisions have
receded from this position,104 these rulings stand as examples that confer
power on directors to do things that do not directly increase shareholder
wealth.
2. Benefit Corporations
Kickstarter is a global crowdfunding site whose mission is to “help bring
creative projects to life.”105 Since its inception in 2009, over eighteen million
people have pledged a collective $5.2 billion to Kickstarter projects.106
Despite these impressive numbers, Kickstarter does not exist solely to
generate revenue for its shareholders. Instead, even though it is a for-profit
corporation, Kickstarter’s primary purpose is bringing projects to life.107 It
has been permitted to seek these goals since its reincorporation as a benefit
corporation in 2015.108
A benefit corporation is an entity created under state law109 that allows for
a corporation to pursue goals beyond maximizing shareholder wealth.110
Benefit corporations serve as a reminder that, while shareholder primacy is
the norm, states are willing to claw back at its rigidity and allow for another
theory to emerge.111 In its charter, the benefit corporation outlines its mission
and ethical goals, and it is then required to adhere to those objectives.112
While still a fledgling entity structure,113 the benefit corporation has slowly
become a more prevalent corporate form that emphasizes the collective
stakeholders rather than just the shareholders.114

creditors, customers, employees, and perhaps even the community generally)”); see also
Strine Jr., supra note 58, at 768–69.
102. 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
103. See id. at 1150.
104. See, e.g., Revlon v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 179–80
(Del. 1986); Quadrant Structured Prods. Co. v. Vertin, 115 A.3d 535, 545–48 (Del. Ch. 2015);
eBay Domestic Holdings v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 26 (Del. Ch. 2010).
105. Hello, KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter.com/about?ref=global-footer [https://
perma.cc/89LS-WLVT] (last visited Oct. 3, 2020).
106. See id.
107. Charter: Kickstarter Is a Benefit Corporation, KICKSTARTER, https://www.
kickstarter.com/charter [https://perma.cc/7ZF7-JNQ5] (last visited Oct. 3, 2020).
108. See id.
109. As of this writing, thirty-seven states and the District of Columbia recognize benefit
corporations. See State by State Status of Legislation, BENEFIT CORP., http://benefitcorp.net/
policymakers/state-by-state-status [https://perma.cc/T3AK-DKBD] (last visited Oct. 3, 2020).
110. See David G. Yosifon, Opting Out of Shareholder Primacy: Is the Public Benefit
Corporation Trivial?, 41 DEL. J. CORP. L. 461, 481–83 (2017).
111. See generally Berger, supra note 50.
112. See Yosifon, supra note 110, at 480–83.
113. See Michael B. Dorff, Why Public Benefit Corporations?, 42 DEL. J. CORP. L. 77, 82–
86 (2017).
114. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 361–368 (2020).
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Benefit corporations are generally created with the intention to produce a
public benefit or benefits in a socially responsible manner.115 This is made
possible by requiring the board of directors to balance the shareholders’
interests with the interests of those affected by the firm’s conduct, while also
taking the corporation’s mission and goals into account.116 As the form is
still new, the number of benefit corporations is diminutive as compared to
the number of incorporated legal entities.117 However, between July 2013
and January 2016, the number of public benefit corporations increased nearly
twelvefold.118 This explosion demonstrates that corporations may be more
receptive to a stakeholder-oriented approach to governance.
While benefit corporations have increased in popularity with state
legislatures over the last five years,119 they are constantly criticized by
corporate law experts.120 Even so, their prevalence in state corporate
statutory schemes highlights that legislatures believe corporate purpose can
fall outside the shareholder primacy model. The states that have enacted
statutes permitting benefit corporations are a mélange of liberal-leaning and
conservative-leaning states, indicating that partisan politics is not a factor in
the adoption of these statutes.121 This further highlights the steady presence
of stakeholder ideals in the United States and their emergence in the twentyfirst century.
3. German Law as a Comparative Case Study
A number of foreign countries have corporate governance laws that reflect
more of a stakeholder approach.122 Germany, in particular, places
considerable emphasis on the employee constituency group.123 There,
corporations are required to have two boards: one managing board that
functions similar to the U.S. board of directors (the Vorstand) and one
115. Id. § 362.
116. Id. §§ 362, 365(a).
117. See Dorff, supra note 113, at 84 (stating that there were approximately 1.1 million
legal entities registered in Delaware at the end of 2014 and fewer than 300 were public benefit
corporations).
118. See id. at 84–85.
119. See State by State Status of Legislation, supra note 109 (showing that, as of this
writing, four states have proposed benefit corporation laws pending legislative review).
120. See, e.g., Sherwin D. Abrams, Decisions, Decisions: Helping Clients Choose the
Right Business Entity, 101 ILL. BAR J. 530, 534 (2013) (asserting that benefit corporations are
mere marketing devices); Robert A. Katz & Antony Page, Sustainable Business, 62 EMORY
L.J. 851, 865 (2013) (arguing that benefit corporations, in reality, may be no different than
regular corporations but rather that they attempt to benefit under the guise of being socially
conscious); Keren G. Raz, Toward an Improved Legal Form for Social Enterprise, 36 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 283, 305–306 (2012). Raz claims that most benefit corporation
statutes provide little protections from the wants of the shareholders. Id. The argument
continues that if shareholders want managers to maximize profits, there are no real protections
to stop the corporation from doing so. Id.
121. See State by State Status of Legislation, supra note 109.
122. See, e.g., Paul L. Davies & Klaus J. Hopt, Corporate Boards in Europe—
Accountability and Convergence, 61 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 301, 301 (2013).
123. See Katharine V. Jackson, Towards a Stakeholder-Shareholder Theory of Corporate
Governance: A Comparative Analysis, 7 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 309, 309–11 (2011).
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supervisory board (the Aufsichtsrat).124 This supervisory council is entirely
separate from the management board and has its own powers.125 The
Aufsichtsrat appoints people to the Vorstand for five-year terms while also
reviewing firm and management performance over the course of the year.126
The Vorstand, on the other hand, makes the day-to-day firm decisions but
ultimately reports to the Aufsichtsrat.127 The Aufsichtsrat also has the right
to examine the books, records, and assets of the corporation.128 Further, the
Aufsichtsrat must approve the annual financial statements of the company.129
These powers allow the Aufsichtsrat to choose the firm’s decision makers. It
also allows them to tightly monitor the Vorstand members.130 In turn, this
should reduce transaction costs due to less information asymmetry. It should
also lead to a reduction in agency costs since the Vorstand is more closely
monitored.131
The composition of the Aufsichtsrat is governed by both Germany’s Stock
Corporation Act132 and its Codetermination Act of 1976.133 The Stock
Corporation Act requires the Aufsichtsrat to have at a minimum three
members and a maximum that depends on the company’s share capital.134
For those companies that meet the requirements of the Codetermination Act,
the Stock Corporation Act requires the Aufsichtsrat be composed of a certain
number of employee representatives.135 The Codetermination Act provides
for half the board to be employee representatives.136 Having employees on
a board with authority serves a dual function by allowing employees to better
124. See id. at 359.
125. See Jun Zhao, Comparative Study of U.S. and German Corporate Governance:
Suggestions on the Relationship Between Independent Directors and the Supervisory Board
of Listed Companies in China, 18 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 495, 500 (2010).
126. See Mark J. Roe, Some Differences in Corporate Structure in Germany, Japan, and
the United States, 102 YALE L.J. 1927, 1941–42 (1993).
127. See id.
128. See Aktiengesetz [AktG] [Stock Corporation Act], Sept. 6, 1965, BGBL I at 1089, last
amended by Gesetz [G], July 17, 2017, BGBL I at 2446, § 111 (Ger.), http://www.gesetze-iminternet.de/englisch_aktg/englisch_aktg.pdf [https://perma.cc/FC2L-5NXL].
129. See id. § 172. This approval can be bypassed if the Aufsichtsrat and Vorstand agree
that the statements are to be approved at the shareholder’s meeting. Id.
130. See Susan-Jacqueline Butler, Models of Modern Corporations: A Comparative
Analysis of German and U.S. Corporate Structures, 17 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMPAR. L. 555, 559–
61 (2000).
131. See generally id.
132. See Stock Corporation Act, §§ 95–96 (Ger.). The Aktiengesetz is the German Stock
Corporation Act and regulates the stock corporation or the Aktiengesellschaft. The
Aktiengesellschaft is the German counterpart to the U.S. corporation. See Butler, supra note
130, at 555, 561 (2000).
133. Mitbestimmungsgesetz [MitbestG] [Codetermination Act], May 4, 1976, BGBL I at
1153, last amended by Gesetz [G], Apr. 24, 2015, BGBL I at 642, art. 7 (Ger.). See generally
Mark Roe, German Codetermination and the German Securities Market, 1998 COLUM. BUS.
L. REV. 167.
134. See Stock Corporation Act, § 95 (Ger.).
135. See id. § 96(1).
136. These employee representatives are split into three groups: workers’ representatives,
union representatives, and managerial employees’ representatives. See Hans-Joachim Mertens
& Erich Schanze, The German Codetermination Act of 1976, 2 J. COMPAR. CORP. L. & SEC.
REGUL. 75, 78 (1979).
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monitor management while also forcing the managing board to be cognizant
of the needs of the labor force.137
4. Benefits and Drawbacks of Stakeholder Theory
The number and substance of academic arguments supporting stakeholder
models of corporate governance have increased considerably in recent
years.138 It is important to note that there is not one general stakeholder
theory but rather a collection of variants that attempt to achieve the same
goal—to consider nonshareholders in corporate decision-making—through
different means.139
Whereas shareholder primacy focuses solely on efficiency, stakeholder
models point to other values while still paying attention to efficiency.140 For
example, trust is a vital element of the theory.141 Some scholars argue that
when a corporation secures the trust of its primary stakeholders, the firm
value increases.142 When a corporation balances the interest of multiple
constituencies, it appears moral and thoughtful.143 This allows stakeholders
to develop greater trust for the corporation and strengthens the firm’s
reputation.144 When a firm rewards its stakeholders, it is more likely they
will work amicably with the company.145 Further, trust can reduce costs.146
When there is trust, monitoring costs decrease as firm decision makers do not
need to be watched as closely.147 Likewise, it should make the board’s
monitoring of some stakeholder groups more efficient.148
Some theorists also argue that stakeholder theories afford a firm’s many
constituencies protection of their property rights.149 The rationale is that
137. See Tom C. Hodge, The Treatment of Employees as Stakeholders in the European
Union: Current and Future Trends, 38 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 91, 123 (2010); Zhao,
supra note 125, at 500.
138. See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of
Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 248 (1999); Martin Lipton, It’s Time to Adopt the New
Paradigm, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Feb. 11, 2019),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/02/11/its-time-to-adopt-the-new-paradigm
[https://
perma.cc/L52W-ZJSR].
139. See R. Edward Freeman, The Politics of Stakeholder Theory: Some Future Directions,
4 BUS. ETHICS Q. 409, 413 (1994).
140. Andrew Keay, Stakeholder Theory in Corporate Law: Has It Got What It Takes?, 9
RICH. J. GLOB. L. & BUS. 249, 260 (2010).
141. See id.
142. See id.
143. See id.
144. Id.; see also JANICE DEAN, DIRECTING PUBLIC COMPANIES: COMPANY LAW AND THE
STOCKHOLDER SOCIETY 94, 108 (2001).
145. See, e.g., John Plender, Giving People a Stake in the Future, 31 LONG RANGE PLAN.
211, 215 (1998).
146. See Keay, supra note 140, at 268–69.
147. See R. William Ide III & Douglas H. Yarn, Public Independent Fact-Finding: A
Trust-Generating Institution for an Age of Corporate Illegitimacy and Public Mistrust, 56
VAND. L. REV. 1113, 1119 (2003).
148. See id. at 1120.
149. See, e.g., R. Edward Freeman & Robert Phillips, Stakeholder Theory: A Libertarian
Defense, 12 BUS. ETHICS Q. 331, 338 (2002).
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these stakeholders have contributed to the capital of the corporation and thus
have some entitlements.150 Many stakeholders make specific investments in
a corporation, much like shareholders do.151 However, the argument against
this is that contracts and regulations generally protect stakeholders.
Creditors, specifically large banks, can enter into detailed contracts that
provide protections.152 Similarly, employees and consumers are protected
by regulatory bodies.153 Thus, arguably, there is no reason to give these
stakeholders special treatment.154 Stakeholder theorists retort by arguing
there is constantly an inequality in bargaining power due to informational
asymmetry.155
Critics take up a number of other issues with stakeholder theories. One of
the primary and earliest criticisms of stakeholder theories is the difficulty in
defining who the stakeholders of a corporation are.156 Edward Freeman
concluded that stakeholders were “any group or individual who can affect or
is affected by . . . the organization’s objectives.”157 This expansive view of
the stakeholder includes governments, environmental groups, and even
terrorists.158 This broad approach highlights how difficult it can be for the
board of directors to truly delineate which groups are stakeholders.159 Some
theorists have attempted to distinguish those who influence the firm, such as
a terrorist group perhaps, and those who have legitimately invested in the
firm.160 Others have differentiated between primary and secondary
stakeholders.161 The ambiguity of which groups constitute stakeholders
makes it more difficult to implement a stakeholder model.
Another criticism of the model is that even if one were to delineate
between stakeholder groups, managers and directors would have difficulty
balancing interests.162 After directors have established who the stakeholders
150. See Roberta S. Karmel, Implications of the Stakeholder Model, 61 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1156, 1171 (1993).
151. See, e.g., Keay, supra note 140, at 266 (discussing how employees may undergo
specialized training or how suppliers may acquire specialized machinery to benefit the
corporation).
152. See, e.g., Stout, supra note 89, at 2011; Van Der Weide, supra note 86, at 45–47.
153. See, e.g., E. Merrick Dodd Jr., Is Effective Enforcement of the Fiduciary Duties of
Corporate Managers Practicable?, 2 U. CHI. L. REV. 194, 202–03 (1935).
154. See Keay, supra note 140, at 292.
155. See, e.g., id. at 293 (discussing that, when making contracts, corporate managers have
more information to base negotiations off of than stakeholders).
156. See, e.g., Ronald Mitchell et al., Toward a Theory of Stakeholder Identification and
Salience: Defining the Principle of Who and What Really Counts, 22 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 853,
862 (1997).
157. See FREEMAN, supra note 92, at 46.
158. See id. at 53; see also Keay, supra note 140, at 274.
159. See Keay, supra note 140, at 274.
160. See Thomas Donaldson & Lee Preston, The Stakeholder Theory of the Corporation:
Concepts, Evidence, and Implications, 20 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 65, 65, 86 (1995).
161. Primary stakeholders are those with a formal, official, or contractual relationship with
the firm, whereas secondary stakeholders do not have these intimate connections. See Keay,
supra note 140, at 274.
162. See R. Edward Freeman & John McVea, A Stakeholder Approach to Strategic
Management, in THE BLACKWELL HANDBOOK OF STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT 189, 194 (M. Hitt
et al. eds., 2001).
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are, they then need to assess and balance the concerns of each group.163 Even
within specific constituencies, there may be divergent interests.164 The
heterogeneity of stakeholder groups makes it nearly impossible for directors
to focus in on a single objective.165 Further, this balancing problem provides
a prime opportunity for directors to engage in opportunism.166
These issues speak to another criticism of the model: that it is
unworkable.167 When compared to the shareholder primacy model, the
stakeholder model is difficult to implement and requires too much analysis
of various groups.168 The model seemingly is too imprecise and takes too
much time to be truly viable.169
While it has its problems, the stakeholder approach has remained
influential and continues to garner support because it addresses important
concerns for corporations: ensuring that the firm’s decision makers consider
all stakeholders. It also compels the board to think about the firm’s longterm health and avoids the pernicious effects of short-term business
decisions.
II. SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY’S BIG ISSUE: SHORT-TERMISM
While it is the corporate norm in the United States, the shareholder
primacy model has serious shortcomings. One of the most significant
shortcomings is the short-termism it often causes. Short-termism is the
notion that decision makers are shortsighted because they focus on short-term
results at the expense of long-term profitability and company value.170 This
can become rampant when institutional investors like hedge funds hold large
positions in the company.171
Part II.A will discuss who these investors are and their motivations for
pursuing short-term strategies. Part II.B will examine other factors that often
play a role in short-termism. Part II.C will survey typical short-term tactics
and why they can be deleterious to a firm’s health. Finally, Part II.D will
assess how the stakeholder model induces long-termism and why this is
better for a company’s health than short-termism.

163. See Keay, supra note 140, at 277.
164. See Steve Letza et al., Shareholding Versus Stakeholding: A Critical Review of
Corporate Governance, 12 CORP. GOVERNANCE 242, 255 (2004).
165. See Michael Jensen, Value Maximisation, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate
Objective Function, 7 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 297, 301 (2001); Keay, supra note 140, at 279–80.
166. See Keay, supra note 140, at 277.
167. See Elaine Sternberg, The Defects of Stakeholder Theory, 5 CORP. GOVERNANCE 3, 5
(1997).
168. See Keay, supra note 140, at 290.
169. See Sternberg, supra note 167, at 5.
170. Robert J. Rhee, Corporate Short-Termism and Intertemporal Choice, 96 WASH. U. L.
REV. 495, 496 (2018).
171. See infra notes 174–82.
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A. Who Are Short-Term Investors and What Motivates Them?
When the purpose of a corporation is maximizing shareholder wealth and
not benefiting all stakeholders, directors often introduce proposals that
benefit the firm in the short term while hurting it in the long term. Shorttermism is the notion that decision makers act shortsightedly by focusing on
short-term results at the expense of long-term profitability and company
value.172 Many scholars argue that short-termism is inauspicious because, in
adopting short-term strategies to pump up share price, the firm sacrifices
long-term health.173
Typically, investors with short-term views are hedge and mutual funds.174
Actively managed hedge and mutual funds have clients paying high fees,
expecting high rates of return on their investments.175 Fund managers who
are judged on their performance over four quarters are likely to support
corporate management strategies that increase stock price in the short
term.176 These fund managers can then turn around and sell those positions.
Thus, it is not surprising many mutual funds have a yearly turnover of 100
percent or more of their equity holdings.177 Likewise, many hedge funds
hold their equity shares for less than two years.178 This greatly differs from
the majority of investors who invest for the long term.179 Over fifty million
households are retail investors and around 54 percent of U.S. households own
stocks.180 These investors usually invest as a means to fund retirement or
education, goals that require a long-term investment strategy.181 So, in
reality, only a select few emphasize the short term, yet these are the
institutional investors with meaningful clout.182
The percentage of U.S. public equities managed by institutional investors
has risen from around 7 to 8 percent of market capitalization in the 1950s to
around 67 percent in 2010.183 In the largest U.S. corporations, institutional

172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

See Rhee, supra note 170, at 496.
See id.
See Stout, supra note 89, at 2017.
See STOUT, supra note 93, at 46.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV. SYS., FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS OF THE UNITED
STATES: SECOND QUARTER 2019, at 2–4 (2019), https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/
z1/20190920/z1.pdf [https://perma.cc/5VPR-RPC6]; see also STOUT, supra note 93, at 46.
180. Retail Investor, INVESTOPEDIA (Mar. 31, 2020), https://www.investopedia.com/
terms/r/retailinvestor.asp [https://perma.cc/N48F-WUDH].
181. See Leo E. Strine Jr., One Fundamental Corporate Governance Question We Face:
Can Corporations Be Managed for the Long Term Unless Their Powerful Electorates Also
Act and Think Long Term?, 66 BUS. LAW. 1, 12 (2010); see also Stout, supra note 89, at 2016.
182. See Stout, supra note 89, at 2009.
183. Marshall E. Blume & Donald B. Keim, Institutional Investors and Stock Market
Liquidity: Trends and Relationships 4 (Aug. 21, 2012) (unpublished manuscript),
http://finance.wharton.upenn.edu/~keim/research/ChangingInstitutionPreferences_21Aug20
12.pdf [https://perma.cc/FC6K-HTJG]; see also MATTEO TONELLO & STEPHAN RABIMOV, THE
CONF. BD., 2010 INSTITUTIONAL INVESTMENT REPORT 12, 22–28 (2010), https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1707512 [https://perma.cc/Y47H-3YPJ].
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investors owned, in the aggregate, 73 percent of the outstanding equity.184
These institutional investors include pension funds, mutual funds, exchange
traded funds, insurance companies, and hedge funds. It is important to note
that these investors vary considerably, including in their organizational
structures, regulatory requirements, and investment strategies.185 One result
of the significant institutional ownership equity is an increase in shareholder
engagement from companies.186 While this can be seen as a positive,187 it
can also lead to undesirable results.188 Institutional investors that hold large
stakes in corporations can play an “activist” role and dictate to directors
exactly what they are looking for; by doing so, they can exercise considerable
influence over the firm.189 If a fund manager has the resources, the manager
can initiate a proxy contest,190 instigate a publicity campaign against the
board,191 or even look at takeover options if dissatisfied with management.192
Thus, larger institutional investors, through various strategies, can often
compel a board of directors to adopt corporate strategies that mirror their
funds’ strategies. These fund strategies are often geared toward pumping up
share value in the short term at the expense of long-term firm health.193
Therefore, it is typical for these institutional investors to look for short-term
profits.
B. Other Factors Contributing to Short-Termism
In addition to the pressures from activist funds, CEOs often feel pressure
to meet short-term expectations from other external sources. Quarterly
reporting is a more recent phenomenon that many believe is linked to short-

184. See TONELLO & RABIMOV, supra note 183, at 22 (looking at the one thousand largest
U.S. corporations).
185. Luis A. Aguilar, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Institutional Investors: Power
and
Responsibility
(Apr.
19,
2013),
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2013spch041913laahtm#P21_2801 [https://perma.cc/CC7X-4RYV].
186. See Holly Gregory et al., Report of the Task Force of the ABA Section of Business Law
Corporate Governance Committee on Delineation of Governance Roles and Responsibilities,
65 BUS. LAW. 107, 112 (2009).
187. See Giovanni Strampelli, Knocking at the Boardroom Door: A Transatlantic
Overview of Director-Institutional Investor Engagement in Law and Practice, 12 VA. L. &
BUS. REV. 187, 191 (2018) (stating that private meetings with firm directors and management
can create company value).
188. Insider trading is seen as a serious issue when there is behind-the-scenes dialogue
between influential institutional investors and corporate managers. See 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(a)
(2019) (discussing the federal regulation against disclosures of material nonpublic
information).
189. See, e.g., Rhee, supra note 170, at 499 (explaining that these fund managers can coerce
company managers through publicity campaigns and proxy contests).
190. See id.
191. See id.
192. See Anup Agrawal & Jeffrey F. Jaffe, Do Takeover Targets Underperform?:
Evidence from Operating and Stock Returns, 38 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 721, 722,
743–44 (2003).
193. It is again important to note that not all funds have these short-term strategic outlooks,
and thus a generalization that all hedge and mutual funds focus on the short-term is not fair.
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termism.194 The SEC has required quarterly reporting, in the shape of a 10Q submission, from public companies since the 1970s.195 These reports have
become a core tool used by analysts to value a company.196 Often when a
company does not meet analyst expectations, share price tumbles. Therefore,
it is common for companies to use questionable accounting techniques197 or
other means to artificially inflate the company’s 10-Q.198 These techniques,
like share buybacks or minimization expenses for employee salaries and
benefits, can damage a firm’s long-term health.199
Executive compensation is another external force that can compel shorttermism. It is normal for a CEO and other executives to have a large part of
their compensation tied to the company’s performance.200 Often the metrics
that compensation is tied to encourage short-term strategies and risk-taking
over the long term.201 CEOs and other managers will often turn to layoffs,
decreases in research and development, and changes to accounting practices
to buoy the firm’s short-term financial position.202 These all have negative
long-term effects for the health of a business.
C. Short-Term Tactics and Why They Hurt the Firm
The board of directors will use various strategies to pump up short-term
share value.203 Issuing dividends and repurchasing outstanding shares are
two methods companies will often incorporate. In 2014, the volume of stock
buybacks reached $550 billion.204 While these buybacks can be a logical
way for companies to use surplus cash, they simultaneously reduce
opportunities to invest in innovation, human capital, or other areas that may
help the firm in the long term. The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act205 is a prime
example of companies lobbying for short-term schemes to the detriment of
194. See, e.g., W. Randy Eaddy, A Case for Eliminating Quarterly Periodic Reporting:
Addressing the Malady of Short-Termism in U.S. Markets with Real Medicine, 74 BUS. LAW.
387, 390–92 (2019) (arguing that short-term reporting leads to short-termism because
managers focus on short-term solutions in order to prop up share price).
195. See id. at 389.
196. See id.
197. See id. at 400–01; Arthur Levitt, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, The
“Numbers Game” (Sept. 28, 1998), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/
1998/spch220.txt [https://perma.cc/3N25-6NLY].
198. See, e.g., Levitt, supra note 197; Stout, supra note 89, at 2017.
199. See William Lazonick, Profits Without Prosperity, HARV. BUS. REV., Sept. 2014, at
46, 50–54.
200. See Gregg M. Galardi & Bruce Grohsgal, Executive Compensation and the Great
Recession, DEL. LAW. Fall 2010, at 24, 27.
201. See id. (discussing how AIG purchased tens of billions of dollars worth of credit
default swaps that triggered executive employee bonuses but ultimately proved costly when
the government had to bail out the insurance giant).
202. See supra notes 1–6.
203. See supra Part II.B.
204. See Ben Levisohn, Benefitting from the Buyback Lull, BARRON’S (Mar. 27, 2015, 8:01
PM),
https://www.barrons.com/articles/benefiting-from-the-lull-in-stock-buybacks1427500898 [https://perma.cc/G4AM-22V9].
205. Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 16, 26, and 43 U.S.C.).
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long-term health. The Act cut the corporate tax rate from 35 percent to 21
percent.206 President Donald Trump believed this reduced rate would
increase corporations’ cash surpluses leading to more jobs, contributions to
employees, and contributions to the rest of the country.207 Instead, corporate
directors primarily used this cash influx to buy back outstanding shares,
inflating stock prices and, in turn, increasing executive compensation.208
Management and boards also often engage in “earnings management.”209
This involves decision makers delaying favorable transactions or hastening
transactions in order to prop up accounting results for quarterly reports.210
Regardless of why directors do this,211 earnings management frequently
results in shortsighted decisions that harm the firm in the long term.212
All these strategies can destroy long-term value in a firm. For example,
when a firm repurchases shares, it forgoes using some of its surplus cash on
investments in research and development and human capital to increase share
price.213 While many defend buybacks and point to research showing
minimal adverse effects,214 it is more plausible that many repurchase plans
end up harming a firm’s long-term value.215 While likely not as detrimental,
dividends can be used in a similar manner. They allow the corporation to
reward its shareholders, particularly those with sizable positions, instead of
investing in innovation.216 It should be noted that many corporations can
206. See id. § 13001(b), 113 Stat. at 2096–98 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
26 U.S.C.).
207. See President Trump, Remarks at Signing of H.R. 1, Tax Cuts and Jobs Bill Act, and
H.R. 1370 (Dec. 22, 2017, 10:45 AM), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/
remarks-president-trump-signing-h-r-1-tax-cuts-jobs-bill-act-h-r-1370
[https://perma.cc/
GAD3-VLJW]; Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Dec. 20, 2017, 6:32 AM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/943489378462130176 [https://perma.cc/5DE4EDWJ].
208. See Matt Egan, Tax Cut Scoreboard: Workers $6 Billion; Shareholders $171 Billion,
CNN BUS. (Feb. 16, 2018, 7:42 AM), https://money.cnn.com/2018/02/16/investing/stockbuybacks-tax-law-bonuses/index.html [https://perma.cc/T9DY-LR53].
209. Sugata Roychowdhury, Earnings Management Through Real Activities Manipulation,
42 J. ACCT. & ECON. 335, 335–36 (2006); see also Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for
Favoring Long-Term Shareholders, 124 YALE L.J. 1554, 1581–82 (2015).
210. See Fried, supra note 209, at 1581–82.
211. See id. See generally LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE:
THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 183–85 (2004).
212. See Fried, supra note 209, at 1582.
213. See Brian J. Bushee, The Influence of Institutional Investors on Myopic R&D
Investment Behavior, 73 ACCT. REV. 305, 307 (1998); J. W. Mason, Disgorge the Cash: The
Disconnect Between Corporate Borrowing and Investment, ROOSEVELT INST. (Feb. 25, 2015),
https://rooseveltinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/RI-Disgorge-the-Cash-201502.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7YL4-BVET] (showing that there is a correlation between increased stock
buybacks and long-term decline in corporate investment); see also Lenore Palladino, The $1
Trillion Question: New Approaches to Regulating Stock Buybacks, 36 YALE J. ON REGUL.
BULL. 89, 90, 94 (2018). But see Jesse M. Fried & Charles C. Y. Wang, Are Buybacks Really
Shortchanging Investment?, HARV. BUS. REV. Mar.-Apr. 2018, at 88, 90–91.
214. See Fried, supra note 209, at 1584–92.
215. See Lazonick, supra note 199 (explaining that by repurchasing shares, companies have
less to invest in their employees and innovation); Stout, supra note 89, at 2017 (discussing the
toxic effect that short-term speculators can have on a business).
216. See Lazonick, supra note 199.
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concurrently pay out dividends and invest.217 These short-term strategies
wipe out significant long-term value from a corporation by redistributing
cash to investors with no long-term benefit.218 Many scholars point out that
short-termism has broader social effects and has led to financial crises in the
past.219 They also argue that short-termism contributes to income
inequality.220 When a company pays out a dividend to its shareholders or
buys back stock, it is directing money to investors, who are typically
wealthy,221 instead of its employees.
D. The Preferred Model: The Stakeholder Model and Long-Termism
Incorporating a stakeholder model would likely reduce short-termism.
Nearly all stakeholders benefit from a firm’s long-term success. A
significant reason why firms engage in short-termism is to conciliate
institutional investors.222 Compelling the board of directors to examine all
stakeholder groups would make it more difficult for the board to implement
short-term strategies like share repurchase plans or dividend payments.223
Important stakeholder groups like employers, creditors, suppliers, and the
surrounding community would all benefit from long-term strategies like
investment in human capital, research and development, or even in increased
employee wages.224 Even most shareholders would benefit from these
strategies in the long term.225 Adopting a stakeholder-oriented theory of
corporate governance would impel decision makers to take on more longterm strategies that would not destroy firm value.
III. WATCHING THE WATCHERS: THE OBSERVING BOARD
The shareholder primacy norm causing corporations to adopt short-term
investment strategies is a serious issue for societal welfare.226 As such, a

217. See, e.g., Johnson & Johnson, Annual Report 2018, at 15–16 (Form 10-K) (Dec. 30,
2018) (showing Johnson & Johnson paid out a dividend while also investing in research and
development).
218. See Lazonick, supra note 199.
219. See William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 TUL. L.
REV. 1275, 1283 (2002); Lynne L. Dallas, Short-Termism, the Financial Crisis, and
Corporate Governance, 37 J. CORP. L. 265, 268 n.7, 269 (2012); Jack B. Jacobs, “Patient
Capital”: Can Delaware Corporate Law Help Revive It?, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1645, 1657
(2011); Rhee, supra note 170, at 500.
220. See, e.g., Edward N. Wolff, Household Wealth Trends in the United States, 1962 to
2016: Has Middle Class Wealth Recovered? 4, 12–13, 15–17 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch.,
Working
Paper
No.
24085,
2017),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=3082268 [https://perma.cc/LDE3-RWQG] (discussing how the stock market
surged in the 1990s while wages remained somewhat stagnant and how stock ownership is
greater within wealthy families).
221. See id.
222. See Strine Jr., supra note 58, at 788, 790–92.
223. See Keay, supra note 140, at 256–57.
224. See Stout, supra note 89, at 2017.
225. See generally id.; Surroca, supra note 16, at 466–72.
226. See supra Part II.C.
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number of solutions have been proposed by politicians227 and scholars.228
However, none of these propositions have been adopted.229 This Note
proposes creating a second observing board that is composed of employee,
creditor, and minority shareholder representatives. These observers will
have limited but defined power that should help gear the managing board (the
regular board of directors) toward strategies that involve all stakeholders.
First, in Part III.A, this Note will determine the best means to implement a
solution, addressing the question of whether this is something best left for
the corporations themselves, for the states, or for the federal government to
implement. Then, in Part III.B, this Note will propose a new type of board
and analyze how it will help curtail short-termism by pressuring the
managing board of directors to look at all stakeholders.
A. A Federal Solution
In crafting the appropriate response to the issue of shareholder primacy, it
is essential to determine the implementation process. The type of solution
will vary depending on who enacts it. For example, if the corporation
implements the solution, it will likely be more cultural than anything else.230
If the states themselves decide to implement solutions, the answers to the
shareholder primacy problem may vary state by state, and the courts would
probably craft solutions through case law.231 If the SEC promulgates a new
rule that aims to solve the issue,232 it would probably involve corporate
disclosure, consistent with the semi-strong form of the efficient market
hypothesis.233 Finally, if Congress enacts legislation addressing the issue,
the legislation could mix and match disclosure and substantive remedies like
227. See, e.g., Stock Buyback Reform and Worker Dividend Act of 2019, S. 2391, 116th
Cong. (2019); Accountable Capitalism Act, S. 3348, 115th Cong. (2018); The Reward Work
Act, S. 2605, 115th Cong. (2018); Corporate Accountability and Democracy Plan, supra note
8.
228. See, e.g., J. Haskell Murray, Adopting Stakeholder Advisory Boards, 54 AM. BUS. L.J.
61, 94–106 (2017); Jeffrey N. Gordon, Addressing Economic Insecurity: Why Social
Insurance Is Better Than Corporate Governance Reform, THE CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Aug. 21,
2019),
https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2019/08/21/addressing-economic-insecuritywhy-social-insurance-is-better-than-corporate-governance-reform [https://perma.cc/36TNYPB6]; Lipton, supra note 138;.
229. None of the politician-proposed solutions have passed through Congress and been
signed into law. Likewise, courts have not given much credence to the proposed solutions of
scholars.
230. See Lipton, supra note 138.
231. See generally Joan MacLeod Heminway, Rock, Paper, Scissors: Choosing the Right
Vehicle for Federal Corporate Governance Initiatives, 10 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 225,
259–61, 259 n.112 (2005) (explaining that federal courts have rulemaking authority derived
frm their constitutional powers).
232. See Investor Bulletin: An Introduction to the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission-Rulemaking and Laws, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Aug. 20, 2015),
https://www.sec.gov/oiea/investor-alerts-bulletins/ib_rulemaking.html
[https://perma.cc/
6JS5-NFB9] (outlining where the SEC’s rulemaking authority derives from).
233. See generally Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 225, 248 (1988) (discussing the
fraud-on-the-market theory, which stands for the proposition that stock prices reflect all
publicly available information).

786

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 89

the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act234 and the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002235 did.
Having the SEC promulgate a new rule makes the most sense for dealing
with this issue.236 This is a middle ground between letting corporations
handle the issue themselves and getting Congress directly involved, and it
also avoids an uneven patchwork of state law. An internal approach taken
by corporations would not lead to success. Despite being the easiest way to
implement any solution, the incentives of the board of directors and chief
officers are not aligned with many of the stakeholders’ incentives.237 Their
self-interest likely will prevent any real, meaningful change from
occurring.238 Likewise, a state-by-state approach would be inefficient and
extremely difficult to implement.239 Many states have already entrenched
shareholder primacy in their common law.240 Without intervention from the
state legislatures, changing this presumption would require considerable time
and creative lawyering.241 It is also doubtful that state legislatures,
independent of the courts, could enact real change. The various state
constituency statutes illustrate the futility of state legislatures in creating
meaningful change in corporate law.242
On the other end of the spectrum, using Congress to implement a solution
would likely create ineffective laws. While Congress has the authority to
implement corporate governance legislation,243 it is not the most competent
when it comes to dealing with complex governance issues.244 In contrast,
the SEC has more specialized resources, more particularized knowledge, and
is likely more efficient than Congress.245 The highly specialized knowledge
of corporate law required falls outside the expertise of Congress given the
significant experience and time required to cultivate this competence.246
Another issue with Congress is that its members can easily be influenced.247
234. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of the U.S.C.).
235. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the
U.S.C.).
236. There are various ways that an agency can promulgate a rule. This Note will focus on
informal rulemaking via notice and comment. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.
§ 553.
237. See supra notes 190–208.
238. See supra notes 190–208.
239. See infra notes 240–42.
240. See, e.g., Strine Jr., supra note 58, at 768 (discussing that it is clear that Delaware
corporate law requires directors to make shareholder welfare their sole end).
241. See, e.g., Aranson v. Schroeder, 671 A.2d 1023, 1027 (N.H. 1995) (stating that
“fundamental changes in our jurisprudence must be brought about sparingly”); Falcone v.
Middlesex Cnty. Med. Soc’y, 170 A.2d 791, 799 (N.J. 1961) (stating that “[t]he persistent
movement of the common law . . . is soundly marked by its gradualness”).
242. See, e.g., Strine Jr., supra note 58, at 767–68.
243. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.); see also Heminway, supra note 231, at 248–52.
244. See Heminway, supra note 231, at 274.
245. See id. at 334–48.
246. See id. at 271–76.
247. See id. at 264–75.
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This, in turn, can water down any piece of legislation.248 There are formal
and informal influences on congressional members.249 A final issue with
Congress is its inefficiency, resulting in part from the number of steps
required to pass a bill.250 A particular bill can remain in committee or in one
of the houses for months and it can ultimately take considerable time to pass
a bill.251 Thus by allowing Congress to craft legislation, there is a good
chance the law looks drastically different by the time it is effective. The
sheer amount of time it would take to pass the bill and the various
compromises will create a law that looks nothing like the original proposed
act.
Allowing the SEC to implement a rule would solve most of these issues.
First, the SEC has authority to promulgate a rule of this sort.252 Since the
solution proposed is disclosure-based in nature, this remains within the
purview of the SEC.253 The SEC is the most competent agency to deal with
this situation. In the past, both courts and the president have deferred to SEC
decisions on financial and corporate issues.254 Further, the SEC has a lengthy
history of rulemaking, strengthening the argument that it is the most
appropriate entity to implement a solution to this corporate governance
issue.255 Compounding this is the fact that the SEC is less partisan than
Congress.256 While SEC commissioners are nominated by the president,
nominations are staggered so as to not allow a president to nominate every
member during the president’s four-year term.257 Independent agencies,
while still subject to some influences, generally are better equipped to resist
political pressures.258 It should be noted, however, that there is a concern of
“agency capture,” through which corporations can influence the SEC in

248. See id. at 307–12.
249. Formal influences on Congress include those of the president and the executive
branch. More informal influences include those of party affiliation and the media. See Michael
Fitts & Robert Inman, Controlling Congress: Presidential Influence in Domestic Fiscal
Policy, 80 GEO. L.J. 1737, 1756 (1992); Peter E. Quint, Reflections on the Separation of
Powers and Judicial Review at the End of the Reagan Era, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 427, 440
(1989).
250. See Heminway, supra note 231, at 265–68.
251. See How Laws Are Made and How to Research Them, USA.GOV (Sept. 17, 2020),
https://www.usa.gov/how-laws-are-made [https://perma.cc/4FSB-JVE9].
252. See Heminway, supra note 231, at 253–55.
253. See id. at 256.
254. See, e.g., Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 332–333 (Del. Ch. 1997) (discussing the
features that make the SEC a competent agency); Presidential Statement on Signing the
Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, 34 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 2247,
2248 (Nov. 3, 1998) (containing statement of former President Bill Clinton: “I am aware of
and agree with the expert views on this issue of the Securities and Exchange Commission”).
255. See Heminway, supra note 231, at 288–89.
256. See, e.g., Roberta S. Karmel, Former Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Threats
to the SEC’s Independence (Nov. 2016), in BUS. L. TODAY, Dec. 20, 2016, at 1, 1–2.
257. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION AND
REGULATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 935–36 (5th ed. 2014).
258. See John C. Coates IV, Private vs. Political Choice of Securities Regulation: A
Political Cost/Benefit Analysis, 41 VA. J. INT’L L. 531, 562 (2001).
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adopting less stringent rules.259 While this is a legitimate concern, the
competence and relative independence of the SEC outweighs the fear of
agency capture, making it the appropriate body to implement this solution.
However, there are drawbacks to this approach. First, agency rule
promulgation takes time.260 The SEC would need to research the solution,
submit a rule proposal, wait and review the comments it receives on that
proposal, and then potentially implement those comments and go through the
comment period again.261 Still, due to the recent swell of support concerning
stakeholder rights, there may be greater urgency for a speedy
implementation. Another potential downside to having the SEC implement
the change is the vagueness and uncertainty that often surrounds new
rules.262 This often leads to three types of costs: learning, uncertainty, and
development.263 Learning costs are the costs that are required in having
judges, lawyers, firms, and other individuals educate themselves on the new
rule.264 Uncertainty costs are those incurred because of the doubt around the
new rule. These costs may include taking action to fill in the gaps and
ambiguities surrounding the rule or the increased legal services a firm might
need.265 Finally, development costs are associated with a firm altering its
business practices to adhere to the new law.266 For the solution this Note
proposes, those costs would reflect the costs associated with adding three
representatives. Conducting the representatives’ elections and including
additional information on proxy solicitations are specific examples of such.
Other than the additional costs that rulemaking produces, companies may
also decide to incorporate outside the United States if what the SEC
promulgates is too burdensome.267 However, this threat seems hollow.
Ultimately, the U.S. has one of the best equipped legal systems to handle
corporate law issues.268 Companies value having a trustworthy and
predictable legal system. Despite the issues that come with SEC rule
promulgation, having the agency implement the solution makes the most
sense.
259. See, e.g., Roberta S. Karmel, Outsider Trading on Confidential Information—a
Breach in Search of a Duty, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 83, 127 (1998) (arguing that the SEC’s
concern about securities analysts is an example of agency capture).
260. See Fast Answers: Rulemaking, How It Works, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Apr. 6,
2011), https://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/answersrulemakinghtm.html [https://perma.cc/
5VZC-K3CH].
261. See id.
262. See Heminway, supra note 231, at 334–48.
263. See id.
264. See id. at 334.
265. See id. at 338.
266. See id. at 342.
267. See generally Corporate Inversion, INVESTOPEDIA (May 4, 2020), https://www.
investopedia.com/terms/c/corporateinversion.asp [https://perma.cc/ZBG7-ZDEE] (discussing
how companies relocate operations from the United States to other countries for lower tax
rates and less strict corporate governance rules).
268. Elizabeth Warren’s New Bill Will ‘Destroy Capitalism’: Harvard Expert, CNBC
POWER LUNCH (Aug. 15, 2018, 3:19 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/video/2018/08/15/elizabethwarrens-new-bill-will-destroy-capitalism-harvard-expert-accountable-capitalism-actincome-inequality-employee-ceo.html [https://perma.cc/2GVN-67EF].
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B. The Observing Board
This Note proposes the SEC promulgate a new rule to help curb the
shareholder primacy norm and, in turn, spur long-term business strategies
from the board of directors. Specifically, the rule should require corporations
of a certain size to add a three-person observing board. By mandating large
corporations to have a three-person observing board, firms will feel pressured
to consider all stakeholder groups, not only shareholders. This observing
board will consist of one employee representative, one creditor
representative, and one minority shareholder representative. Part III.B.1 will
detail these positions and the rationale behind having representatives for
these specific constituencies. Part III.B.2 will then examine the powers of
this observer board, which bear some resemblance to the powers of the
Aufsichtsrat in Germany.269
1. The Election and Composition of the Observing Board
The observing board will contain three members: representatives of the
employees, creditors, and minority shareholders of the firm. These are
constituencies whose representations in the boardroom will have the largest
impact for all the firm’s stakeholders.270 These board members will be
elected in specific ways to ensure that all members of each constituency
group have a say in their representative.
First, the employees will elect their representative through a plurality
voting system conducted on the company’s intranet. Each employee,
regardless of position within the company, will have one vote. One vote per
person ensures that upper management cannot plant someone more aligned
with their interests on the board. It also allows for the rank-and-file
employees to have the greatest say in who represents them. The hitch with
this is that Delaware law does not allow employees to nominate directors.271
Requiring disclosure from companies that do not nominate the director that
has been suggested by the employees would provide a work-around for this
issue. The employees would still have their election process and nominate
someone, and the board would then have the option of actually putting this
person on the ballots. If they chose not to, they would be required to disclose
why they did not incorporate the nominee of the employees. This would have
a similarly coercive effect for the board of directors because the board would
have to explain its decision to forgo employees’ nominee in its proxy
statement.
As for the nomination process, the employee representative will be selfnominated. While independence from the company may seem important,
these concerns are largely overblown. It is unlikely that any elected
269. See supra Part I.C.3.
270. See, e.g., Murray, supra note 228, at 94 n.150 (stating that a good place to look for the
major stakeholder groups would be on the Benefit Corporation website, which includes
information on shareholders and employees).
271. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 112 (2020).
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employee will be so disputatious that the employee’s job is put in danger.
There are advantages to having an actual employee as a representative,
primarily that it is likely to help increase transparency between management
and the workers. The representative can immediately relay concerns and
issues other employees are having to the board, without having to go through
a middleman. This should increase efficiencies and rapport between the
groups.
The employees’ representation on the board is essential for the observing
board to work as intended. Employees are interested in the long-term health
of the firm at which they are employed.272 While critics argue that employees
are able to contract for their employment, the reality is that most workers in
the United States, particularly those at will, do not have the same protections
as shareholders.273 Thus, generally, a worker’s best job protection is a
healthy firm.
Having employees represented on the observer board will also help in
establishing trust and through that trust, better dissemination of information.
It is hard to quantify the importance of trust in a firm,274 but it is clear that
by having workers represented in board discussions, more trust will form
between directors and officers and the rest of the firm’s employees.275 An
increase in trust should lead to more open lines of communication between
the directors and employees. Directors can act faster and more efficiently in
making decisions involving labor, factories, equipment, and the like, thus
reducing firm transaction costs.276 Some argue that in systems with advisory
boards, communications are chilled because directors and officers fear leaks
and have a general lack of trust.277 However, with strict confidentiality
agreements and enforcement of those agreements, this fear should dissipate
and allow for the managing board to talk more openly.
The creditor representative selection process will operate differently than
the employee process. First, it is important to note that the creditor
representative will primarily represent creditors holding unsecured debt.
These are the creditors with the lowest priority in a bankruptcy proceeding
and are most likely to lose their investment. Thus, they care more about the
firm’s long-term health than other creditors.278 Choosing a representative
272. See Kent Greenfield, The Place of Workers in Corporate Law, 39 B.C. L. REV. 283,
309 (1998) (discussing that workers are not diversified in their labor investments and that they
have a strong concern about firms’ financial health because they face unemployment if the
company falters).
273. See id.
274. See, e.g., René Reich-Graefe, Deconstructing Corporate Governance: The
Mechanics of Trusting, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 103, 105–09 (2013).
275. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral
Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1809 (2001) (discussing how
language can cultivate trust and contractarian talk can stifle it).
276. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Privately Ordered Participatory Management: An
Organizational Failures Analysis, 23 DEL. J. CORP. L. 979, 1005–06 (1998); see also Hodge,
supra note 137, at 123.
277. See Jan Lieder, The German Supervisory Board on Its Way to Professionalism, 11
GERMAN L.J. 115, 149 (2010).
278. See 11 U.S.C. § 507.
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will require looking at all the unsecured debt offerings. The trustee of the
bank or trust company of the largest outstanding offering will serve as the
creditor representative.279 It is worth mentioning that Delaware allows for
corporations to give creditors the right to vote.280 However, in practice, this
is nonexistent when the firm is solvent.281 The process outlined above is
responsive to this reality. Rather than allowing creditors to vote, a custom
that seemingly no corporation has allowed for, the representative will be
chosen based on preexisting criteria. One potential problem with this
approach is that the same trustee could sit on the board for decades.
However, the rule will require that after serving a maximum of three oneyear terms, the trustee of the bank of the next largest outstanding offering
will take over. If the offering becomes due during a term, that trustee
becomes ineligible. This system ensures that the creditor representative is
someone who has a stake in the long-term health of the firm but also
forecloses the opportunity for corruption. Another problem is that some
creditors, like trade creditors, may have various conflicting interests that
could result in a competitor receiving confidential information. Inserting a
trustee precludes this potential for impropriety.
Again, like with the employee representative, the creditors have no legal
entitlement to nominate a director. A similar workaround like the one
outlined above with the employee nominee could be fashioned for the
creditor representative. If the presumptive creditor nominee is not selected
by the board, the board would be compelled to explain why in its proxy
statement.
Having a creditor representative further strengthens the long-term focus of
the observing board. Those holding onto unsecured debt from a firm want
their principal returned at the end of the loan term. While some might argue
that creditors are already protected contractually,282 the protections are much
weaker for holders of unsecured debt.283 They typically do not want the firm
engaging in risky, short-term behavior that could be detrimental to the longterm health of the firm.284

279. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 221 (2020) (showing that the Delaware code already
allows for creditors to be “deemed to be stockholders” if the certificate of incorporation so
provides). In this context, a trustee is a financial institution that is appointed by an issuer of
debt to enforce the terms of the indenture. The trustee acts as the agent of the holders of the
debt securities.
280. See id.
281. See generally 3 JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
CORPORATIONS § 18:3 (3d ed. 2019).
282. See Van Der Weide, supra note 86, at 45–47.
283. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking a Corporation’s Obligations to Creditors, 17
CARDOZO L. REV. 647, 651 n.10 (1996) (discussing how contract law largely governs creditor
protections and that there is no common law that protects the holder of unsecured debt, leaving
the creditor short on protection).
284. It should also be noted that the unsecured debt of non-blue-chip companies, with
riskier credit agency ratings, can mirror stock prices. Thus, when share price goes up,
company bonds may trade at a premium. Alternatively, when share price decreases, the bonds
may trade at a discount.

792

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 89

Even though this perspective is identical to that of the employee
representative, there are clearly situations where their interests could diverge.
For example, if a firm was considering issuing a new class of debt to fund
investment in a new factory, the employee representative would likely
approve of this as it would create more jobs, while the creditor representative
would probably be opposed to the suggestion of creating more debt. Thus,
while their perspectives may be similar, there are important distinctions
between the employee and creditor representatives that make each necessary.
Finally, the minority shareholders will elect their representative in a
similar manner to that of the general election process for directors.285 In
determining who can vote on the shareholder representative, the rule will
mirror SEC Rule 14a-8 for shareholder proposals.286 The floor requirement
will look identical to Rule 14a-8: to vote, one must hold $2000 worth of the
firm’s stock continuously for at least one year. The rule will add a ceiling of
$100,000 for voting purposes. This would allow only those shareholders
who hold between $2000 and $100,000 of the company’s stock continuously
for one year to vote for the minority shareholder representative. A process
like this ensures that the minority shareholder representative is someone
whose incentives are aligned with the typical shareholder.287
The Delaware code does allow for corporations to adopt a bylaw that
permits individuals nominated by shareholders to be included in a proxy
statement.288 Thus the questions that arose with employees and creditors
electing a representative are not issues here.
The voting process for the minority shareholder representative will be
indistinguishable from the election process for ordinary directors. On the
proxy statement, below the candidates for the regular board, there will be a
list of the nominees for the representative spot. Under each candidate’s
name, there will be a short summary of pertinent information.289
Shareholders will then vote for one individual.290 The board of directors will
not give a recommendation for any specific candidate. This process is
desirable because it combines feasibility, since it mirrors the method already
in place, and accessibility, since it allows for shareholders to easily cast a
knowledgeable vote.
By being represented on the observing board, minority shareholders act as
an important counterbalance to the employees and creditors, while sharing
some similar incentives to those of the other groups. Shareholders, regardless
of the number of shares they hold, are going to be less risk averse than
285. See supra notes 28–33.
286. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(b) (2019).
287. See supra Part II.A.
288. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 112 (2020).
289. Information may include background, qualifications, prior work history, and any other
affiliations.
290. Since it would be too costly to produce different proxy statements for the shareholders
eligible to vote for a representative, the system would allow everyone to vote for the
representative and then on the back end, only the votes of the shareholders who qualify would
count.
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employees and creditors.291 Shareholders can diversify their investments
across a broad spectrum of companies. This allows for a greater risk
threshold. If a firm investment fails, it may mean employees get laid off or
creditors do not recoup their investments but shareholders can take the loss
and move on. Having a group willing to embrace risk is important for the
observing board so as to prevent complete suppression of risk. Risky
investments are important for many firms to undertake.292 Additionally, the
minority shareholder representative will still have a long-term view because
minority shareholders tend to make long-term investments to fund, for
Thus, by including minority
example, education or retirement.293
shareholders, the observing board provides a perspective that appreciates
some risk, while remaining long-term oriented.
2. The Powers of the Observing Board
The powers of this board, while limited, are strong enough to change the
decision-making of the board of directors. Striking the right balance is
crucial.294 If the observing board has too little power, the managing board
will not take it seriously and no real change will occur.295 On the other hand,
giving the observing board too much power may effect the managing board’s
business judgment.296 Therefore, the observing board needs legitimate but
restrained powers. These powers will be disclosure-based since mandating
disclosure can have a prominent effect on director decision-making,297 while
also not providing substantive power to the observers. This disclosure
solution is also desirable as it is not a radical upheaval of current law.
One of the most basic powers of the observers is their quorum power. For
the managing board of directors to establish a quorum, at least two observers
must be present. This will safeguard against the managing board meeting
without all members of the observing board present. It will also increase
transparency between the two boards, something that is essential for crafting
effective disclosure.298 Most importantly, since observers will be required to
submit various disclosures, as discussed below, they must be present to
monitor board meetings. Ideally these observers will also participate in board
meetings, particularly by bringing up issues raised by their respective groups.
This will likely be most useful for the employees because their day-to-day is
affected by many of the board’s decisions. The goal of this approach is also
291. See WILLIAM A. ALLEN & REINIER KRAAKMAN, COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE
LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 344 (5th ed. 2016).
292. See generally Renee M. Jones, The Irrational Actor in the CEO Suite: Implications
for Corporate Governance, 41 DEL. J. CORP. L. 713, 725 (2017).
293. See supra Part II.A.
294. See Tien Glaub, Lessons from Germany: Improving on the U.S. Model for Corporate
Governance, 5 BYU INT’L L. & MGMT. REV. 235, 241 (2009).
295. See id.
296. See id.
297. See Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate
Social Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1239–42 (1999).
298. See, e.g., Eaddy, supra note 194, at 401–02.
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to increase transparency within the firm. By having a direct line of
communication to the managing board of directors, it is reasonable to assume
the firm will become more efficient.299
The primary power of the observers is their authority and obligation to
submit various disclosure documents. This power is indispensable for
shifting the board of directors’ focus from purely the shareholder. The first
required disclosure that each observer must make will be in a proxy
statement. This can easily be implemented by amending the requirements
for Schedule 14A, which dictates the information required in a proxy
statement.300 Each observer will draft a summary discussing business and
compensation highlights and the observer’s stance on those decisions. These
summaries will be on the first page of the proxy statement, immediately
following the table of contents. Then, for each proposal, including the
election of directors, each observer will disclose the observor’s stance and
provide a brief summary of its potential impact on its constituency group.
This will include both management and shareholder proposals governed by
Rule 14a-8. So, when the board of directors nominates individuals for board
spots, each observer would disclose a position on the candidate and whether
they recommend voting for or against each candidate. Likewise, if
management proposed issuing additional stock, each observer would briefly
comment on the potential impact of the decision on the relevant constituency
and whether they recommend voting for or against the proposal.
These disclosures and recommendations from the observers serve
important purposes. First, they give shareholders more perspectives to
consider when voting on proposals. Typically, a shareholder gets a
recommendation exclusively from the board of directors that is inherently
one-sided.301 Allowing the observers to disclose their constituencies’ views
should reduce costs by providing the principal (the shareholder) with better
information regarding the proposed activities of the agent.302 These
disclosure measures should also lead to the board of directors focusing more
on other stakeholders. If the firm proposes engaging in a short-term activity,
like a share repurchase plan, those shareholders seeking long-term value can
read the thoughts of the observers and may decide to sell their shares and
invest elsewhere. Thus, it is likely that the Schedule 14A disclosures from
the observers will reduce agency costs while also pushing the board of
directors to consider all stakeholders.
Each observer will also make a year-end disclosure as part of the
company’s 10-K submission, a corporation’s annual report that summarizes
the company’s financial performance. In this disclosure, the representative
299. See Keay, supra note 140, at 257.
300. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a (2019).
301. Shareholder proposals also contain an explanation from the shareholder who proposed
the idea, but the board of directors has the ability to respond and get the last word in.
302. See generally Iris H-Y Chiu, Reviving Shareholder Stewardship: Critically
Examining the Impact of Corporate Transparency Reforms in the UK, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 983,
989–91 (2014) (discussing how economists believe disclosure enhances liquidity and reduces
monitoring costs).
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will provide: (1) the potential risks facing its constituency group in the
upcoming fiscal year; (2) the major transactions of the past fiscal year and
how each has, and will continue to, impact the specific group; and (3) an
outlook of the upcoming fiscal year specific to the representative’s
constituency. These disclosures will serve a similar purpose to those in the
proxy statement. While the minority shareholder disclosure will heavily
mirror the regular 10-K submission, the creditor and employee report will
provide a clearer picture of the potential risks, along with commentary on the
firm’s decisions. This again provides more well-rounded insight into the
health of the firm. Ideally it will also make the board of directors more wary
of undertaking actions that directly harm other stakeholder groups. If it does,
its decision will be reflected in the year-end report and cannot be concealed.
This will force directors to think harder before engaging in a short-term
action. Having a year-end report from each representative that outlines
forward-looking risks and expectations will create more robust disclosures
that investors can use. The hope is that directors, cognizant of this, will
conduct greater deliberations before undertaking an action that exclusively
benefits the shareholder, allowing them to at least consider the other
stakeholders.
The observers will have various other powers, like the ability to access the
firm’s financial records and to suggest a course of action for major decisions.
Allowing the observers to access the firm’s records reinforces the goal of
increased transparency and gives the representatives more information on
which to base their disclosures. While some believe that giving nondirectors
or managers access to sensitive records may lead to leaks,303 this fear is
probably overblown. Even so, to protect against the potential divulgence of
confidential, sensitive information, each representative would sign a number
of confidentiality agreements. Another power for the observers is letting the
representatives suggest a course of action for major firm decisions,
something similar to the disclosures they make in Schedule 14A filings.
However, it varies in the fact that the representative can suggest a specific
plan and, if that plan is not adopted, the board of directors must explain why.
This rule would adopt a number of the elements of Rule 14a-8 regarding
shareholder proposals.304 This power allows for shareholders to get a fuller
disclosure of the potential issues with a board’s course of action before
initiating the action. This enables shareholders to be better informed of the
potential risks and arguments against the proposed action. Likewise, this
disclosure will allow for a more accurate reflection of share price. These two
powers will reinforce the importance of transparency and disclosure of other
long-term stakeholder perspectives. The goal is that the board of directors
will consider the positions of nonshareholders when making decisions. If
they do not, it will be disclosed and share price will likely decline. These
powers, while not substantive, have enough bite to affect real change.

303. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 276, at 1061; Hodge, supra note 137, at 127.
304. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8.
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CONCLUSION
The public’s frustration with corporate America has begun to boil over, as
reflected in the statements of politicians and corporate executives. The
shareholder primacy norm and its often negative consequences must slowly
be dismantled so that corporations can also consider other firm stakeholders.
Doing so will help reduce the influence of powerful institutional investors,
while allowing firms to focus more on long-term profits. An advantageous
way to achieve this is through an SEC rule that creates positions for three
board observers representing different constituency groups. Having an
employee, minority shareholder, and creditor representative come together
to form an observing board will create more varied disclosure and will
provide stakeholders with a more forceful voice, compelling the board of
directors to take them into account.

